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COMMENTS
Brown P. Walker in 1896.22 Such a statute, however, is unnecessary to
force testimony from a witness,23 and it would preclude states from
enforcing their own criminal laws upon certain witnesses. While the
statute in the principal case was rightly supported as a necessary and
proper incident to the legislative powers of Congress, 4 it is question-
able whether a complete immunity statute directly affecting the states
could be validated on the same basis.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--DIVORCE-
CONDONATION BY A SINGLE ACT OF INTERCOURSE
Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1953)
A preliminary decree was entered on a wife's petition for divorce on
grounds of her husband's adultery. Before the final decree the hus-
band induced his wife to have sexual intercourse with him in the
belief that he could thus defeat the divorce and thereby deprive the
wife of a property settlement. The husband then petitioned to vacate
the preliminary decree. The appellate court held as a matter of law
that, because of the husband's bad faith, this single act of intercourse
was not condonation.,
Condonation is the voluntary forgiveness by one spouse of a marital
offense committed by the other and bars a divorce action for that of-
fense.- Condonation requires actual knowledge of the guilty act and
may be accomplished by express words or by conduct.3 Since a find-
ing of condonation may be based on conduct, a subjective lack of for-
giveness may be immaterial.4 By implication of law, the condonation
22. 161 U.S. 591, 606-608 (1896). But see Corwin, The Supreme Court's Con-
stru tion of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. REy. 191, 197 (1930).
23. See note 19 supra.
24. See note 6 supra.
1. Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d. 717 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1953). This was a common
law determination of the case. The husband contended, as a second ground of
appeal, that a statute, DEX,. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1528 (1953), governed the case.
The statute provides in part:
On a petition for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the defendant...
proves that the plaintiff.., has admitted the defendent into conjugal society
or embrace after knowledge of the adultery ... the petition shall be dis-
missed. [Italics added.]
The issue under the statute was basically the same as that under the common
law. The court held the husband's act was fraud, which vitiated the wife's con-
sent, and there was no voluntary "embrace" within the meaning of the statute.
2. MADDEN, DoMEsTIc RE=ATONS §§ 90-91 (1931), gives the elements of con-
donation. 2 VERNIER AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 77 (1932), treats the statutory
coverage of the subject in the several states.
3. MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 2.
4. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 90-91, p. 303 (1931). See Phinizy v.
Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185 (1922).
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is on condition that the offender will not repeat the particular act and
will thereafter treat the spouse with conjugal kindness.-
While the cases are in conflict as to whether a single act of inter-
course is condonation as a matter of law, a majority of the jurisdic-
tions deciding the question still appear to rule that it is.( Of course,
it follows from the definition of condonation that the rule does not ap-
ply where the intercourse was not voluntary because induced by fraud
or duress,7 or was done without knowledge of the guilty act., Also, it is
often stated that the rule is applied less strictly against the wife than
against the husband.9 Some of the cases are difficult to explain except
by this latter consideration."0
In a recent Ohio case,11 where the matter was one of first impres-
5. This is in the nature of a condition subsequent. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 233 S.W.
2d 829, 833 (Mo. App. 1950). Its breach entirely nullifies the condonation so that
the divorce action is based upon the offense originally condoned. This is significant
because the act sufficient to defeat condonation can be less than that which gives
ground for divorce. Mason v. Mason, 46 RJ. 43, 124 Atl. 730 (1924); MADDEN,
DoMESTIc RELATIONS §§ 90-91 (1931). For an interesting historical discussion
of this point see 2 BISHOP, MAu AGE, DivoRcE AND SEPAR&TIoN § 312 (1891).
6. Buck v. Buck, 205 Ark. 918, 171 S.W.2d 939 (1943) ; Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154
Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185 (1922) ; Harnett v. Harnett, 55 Iowa 45, 7 N.W. 394 (1880)
(apparently sufficient were it not for compulsion); Collins v. Collins, 194 La. 446,
193 So. 702 (1940) ; Toulson v. Toulson, 93 Md. 754, 50 At]. 401 (1901) ; Hulfine v.
Hufine, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 430, 74 N.E.2d 764 (1947) ; Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 35
S.E.2d 401 (1945). Cases holding it is not necessarily condonation are: Dion v.
Dion, 128 Conn. 416, 23 A.2d 314 (1941) ; Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 144 N.E.
763 (1924); Koffman v. Koffman, 193 Mass. 593, 79 N.E. 780 (1907); Rushmore
v. Rushmore, 12 N.J. Misc. 575, 174 Atl. 469 (Ch. 1934) ; Panther v. Panther, 147
Okla. 131, 295 Pac. 219 (1931).
7. Harnett v. Harnett, 55 Iowa 45, 7 N.W. 394 (1880); Rex v. Rex, 39 Ohio
App. 295, 177 N.E. 527 (1930).
8. Laycock v. Laycock, 52 Ore. 610, 98 Pac. 487 (1908).
9. Harnett v. Harnett, 55 Iowa 45, 7 N.W. 394 (1880) ; Gardner v. Gardner, 68
Mass. 434 (1854); Shackelton v. Shackelton, 48 N.J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl. 935 (Ch.
1891). The policy behind this view is that the wife, being dependent on the hus-
band, may actually find it difficult to leave him, and may have to submit of neces-
sity. 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 284 (1891); MADDEN, Do-
MEsTIc RErATIONS §§ 90-91, p. 304 (1931).
Furthermore, if the husband sues successfully for divorce, the strong probability
is that the wife will be without support, to the detriment of society. However, if
the wife is successful against the husband, she will receive alimony. Thus, the
social value of maintaining the family is greater in the first case than in the
second.
There is also a disposition by the courts to favor the suffering wife. See Fekany
v. Fekany, 118 Fla. 699, 702, 160 So. 192, 193 (1935).
Some authorities further complicate the law on condonation by distin uishing be-
tween condonation of adultery and condonation of other offenses (usually cruelty).
See McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 227, 56 S.W. 858, 861 (1900) ; 17
Am. JuR., DivoRc AND SEPARATION §§ 209, 210 (1938). They say a single act of
intercourse will condone adultery, whereas it will not condone cruelty. As shown
by a reading of the McClanahan case, the distinction apparently results from the
failure properly to analyze the fact situations. These authorities do not take
cognizance of the fact that continuing cruelty after intercourse breaches the con-
dition that the offending party treat the condoning spouse with conjugal kindness,
and therefore divests the condonation. They also fail to realize that there is no
basic reason why intercourse should condone adultery and not cruelty.
10. E.g., Shackelton v. Shackelton, 48 N.J. Eq. 364, 21 At. 935 (Ch. 1891).
11. Huffine v. Huffine, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 430, 74 N.E.2d 764 (1947).
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sion, the court reviewed the cases and held purely as a moral proposi-
tion M' that a single act of intercourse is condonation. The court
pointed out that the injured party is still protected, since the for-
giveness is conditioned on future conjugal kindness. However, it
seems the trend is to hold that a single act of intercourse is not con-
donation as a matter of law.1 The jurisdictions which hold this have
done so on the grounds that the injured party must subjectively in-
tend to condone. 14
The court in the principal case held that a single act of sexual inter-
course alone is not condonation as a matter of law.' 5 It did not do so,
however, on the ground that the intent to condone was lacking, for
it specifically found that the wife did intend to condone. It seems
difficult, moreover, considering the facts of the case and the language
of the court, to fit the result within any of the other rationales",
holding that a single act of sexual intercourse is not condonation. It
is true the court treated the husband's conduct as a fraud on the wife,
which removed the voluntary nature of her consent. The mere intent
to defeat the divorce action without misrepresentations or false prom-
ises, however, seems to fail short of what the cases in this area con-
sider to be fraud.17 Absent active fraud, the condition of conjugal
kindness is deemed sufficient to protect the injured spouse.'5
Regardless of whether the husband's conduct is characterized as a
fraud, the decision was based on the ground that the husband's mo-
tive and intent at the time of the act, positive bad faith, as a matter
of law prevented any condonation ab initio,"9 even though the injured
12. As a Virginia court succinctly stated, "[i]t would be shocking... to grant
a divorce to parties who ... litigated by day and copulated by night." Tarr
v. Tarr 184 Va. 443, 449, 35 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1945).
13. Compare Delliber v. Delliber, 9 Conn. 233 (1832) with Dion v. Dion, 128
Conn. 416, 23 A.2d 314 (1941); Anonymous, 6 Mass. 197 (1809) with Koffman v.
Koffman, 193 Mass. 593, 79 N.E. 780 (1907); Shackelton v. Shackelton, 48 N.J. Eq.
364, 21 AtI. 935 (Ch. 1891) with Rushmore v. Rushmore, 12 N.J. Misc. 575, 174
Atl. 469 (Ch. 1934).
14. Quigley v. Quigley, 310 Mass. 415, 38 N.E.2d 624 (1941); Drew v. Drew,
250 Mass. 41, 144 N.E. 763 (1924) ; Rushmore v. Rushmore, 12 N.J. Misc. 575, 587,
174 Atl. 469, 476 (Ch. 1934). See Panther v. Panther, 147 Okla. 131, 133, 295 Pac.
219, 221 (1931).
15. In fact, the court held as a matter of law that there was no condonation.
Under the circumstances the act of intercourse did not even present an issue of
fact as to whether the wife had condoned. Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d 717, 719(Sup. Ct. Del. 1953).
16. See text at notes 7-10 supra. The court did not consider whether the hus-
band's coldness after the intercourse breached the condition of subsequent conjugal
kindness.
17. See Hash v. Hash, 115 Ind. App. 437, 59 N.E.2d 735 (1945); Rex v. Rex,
39 Ohio App. 295, 177 N.E. 527 (1930). And compare the principal case with
Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185 (1922) and Parley v. Farley, 278
Mich. 361, 270 N.W. 711 (1936).
18. Perhaps an underlying factor in this case was that there was an attempted
perversion of a judicial decree. The husband was attempting mala fide to defeat
a decree of the court.
19. Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d 717, 719 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1953).
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party intended to condone. This decision goes far in holding that the
offending party's bad faith, though apparently short of active fraud,
is conclusive proof that there is no condonation. The injured party
is not forced to rely on the condition subsequent for protection. The
court goes even further, suggesting that the offending party must
affirmatively intend a reconciliation before there is condonation.20
The court, however, did not consider the situation where there
is a mere neutrality of intent, as where intercourse was had just
as a satisfaction of desire. Thus, the language suggesting that the
offender must affirmatively intend to be reconciled leaves open the
question whether a mere neutrality of intent would result in a finding
of no condonation as a matter of law.
The principal case is in line with the trend holding that a single
act of intercourse is not conclusive on the issue of condonation, but
merely an evidentiary factor. It goes further than any of the other
cases in indicating that the offending party's intent may often be
determinative. If the language of the court were taken at face value,
condonation would be made to depend on the mutual intent and good
faith of the parties. This seems a salutary result. The policy behind
condonation is the maintenance of the home, and this would appear
desirable only when both parties are in good faith in wanting to con-
tinue the marriage.
EVIDENCE-PARTY NOT BOUND BY TESTIMONY OF OWN WITNESS
Johnson iv. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 208 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953)
A railroad detective shot and killed a man whose administratrix
sued the railroad under a wrongful death statute. Plaintiff called to
the stand the detective who was the sole witness to the shooting.'
His uncontradicted testimony was that decedent attacked him with
a knife when the detective attempted to arrest decedent for the com-
mission of a felony. Corroborating testimony established that the
detective showed the effects of knife wounds. A verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed by the appellate court which held that
plaintiff was not bound by the uncontradicted testimony of the detec-
20. Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d 717, 719 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1953). This seems to be
the idea accepted in New Jersey. See Rushmore v. Rushmore, 12 N.J. Misc. 575,
588, 174 At. 469, 476 (Cl. 1934); Totten v. Totten, 60 At. 1095, 1096 (N.J. Ch.
1905).
1. The court pointed out that plaintiff did not try to invoke FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b) which provides:
A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent
of a public or private corporation ... and interrogate him by leading ques-
tions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party....
Since the detective was not an "adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent" of the railroad corporation, it appears that plaintiff was not entitled to the
benefits of this rule. See Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers, 182 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1950).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss3/5
